

## North Korean Contingency and The Determinants of Its Stabilization\*

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This study indicated that four factors, namely centralized power, economic stability, racial identity between the subjects and objects of military government, and the level of social division, were commonly important elements. The most critical factor among them was the power structure of the target country of stabilization.

To make strategies succeed even in an extremely chaotic situation of North Korea, a wide range of strategies encompassing military, foreign affairs, and administration is needed. This study diagnosed the possibility of success and failure of stabilization strategies undertaken through military governance focusing on four variables. Besides these variables, minute additional elements can influence the outcomes of success or failure in complex ways.

The analysis herein confirmed that stabilization can succeed when the control of central power is assured and the intervention of foreign power is deterred through military governance.

**Keywords:** North Korea, Contingency plan, Military government, Stability operations, Unification of Korean peninsula

### Introduction

Should the contingency of regime collapse occur in North Korea, power shifts on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia will be inevitable. Upheavals in the North Korean political system will have significant impact on a Korean society that has longed for reunification for the last seventy years. To ensure peace and stability on the

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Peninsula in the event of a sudden change, it is essential to establish an executive stabilization strategy that effectively responds to a turbulent situation within North Korea in its early stages. Various aspects of this stabilization strategy, including the military, foreign affairs, and governmental administration, need to be addressed in order to increase the chances of success even in an extremely chaotic situation. To achieve the minimal level of stabilization necessary for the government to take effective control, it is essential to implement a transitional military governance in the initial political vacuum.<sup>1</sup>

Military rule may be necessary to provide urgent humanitarian assistance and facilitate a smooth transition to civilian government in circumstances in which state institutions cannot properly perform day-to-day functions. First, there should be fundamental measures to shore up the governing authorities and maintain rule of law when it would be very difficult to expect social stability. The police forces may not be enough to effectively contain with a crisis situation like contingency. Securing social order is paramount, preceding other priorities.

Second, military rule allows for more effective stabilization operations. Stabilization operations are efforts to restore order and stability when many essential political, economic, and human elements that are critical to general security are absent.<sup>2</sup> Stabilization operations should be executed in close coordination with public administration as it concerns the society at large.

Third, there needs to be more comprehensive measures, such as state reconstruction. After a contingency in North Korea, many North Korean residents want to see the establishment of a new, democratic government rather than the continuation of an oppressive regime. As more fundamental changes are demanded, there will be limitations to the extent of fully utilizing existing state apparatuses. Moreover, there might emerge strong resistance from the stakeholders of the old regime, particularly when they can mobilize their own military force.

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1. For the purpose of this study, the North Korean contingency is assumed to have no civilian alternative to fill the political vacuum.

2. JCS, *JP 3-07: Stability Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), pp. I-1-I-2.

Accordingly, military rule should be considered as a viable option to ensure successful stabilization operations. The military rule will be transferred to civilian rule as soon as certain conditions such as reconstruction and establishing democratic principles are met. Therefore, it is critical to understand the factors that contribute to the success and failure of stabilization strategies undertaken by previous military governments. Granted, stabilization efforts have produced different outcomes depending on each country's political, social and economic contexts and circumstances. For a North Korean contingency, its political and societal particularities also should be considered when devising a strategy for its stabilization. It is important to identify the different determinants of stabilization according to various contexts and circumstances drawn from the analysis of previous stabilization strategies of military governance. This research aims to draw useful policy implications for the Republic of Korea's response to a North Korean contingency by conducting a comparative structural analysis of different military governments since World War II and identifying key factors that determined the successes and/or failures of their respective stabilization policies.

## Research review and method

A review of existing literature identified the following criteria for discussion: the characteristics of political change in Third World countries;<sup>3</sup> the causes and outcomes of failed states that are potentially applicable to North Korea;<sup>4</sup> reconstruction cases following American interventions;<sup>5</sup> the causes of failure in the stabilization of Iraq;<sup>6</sup> and

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3. Charles F. Andrain, *Political Change in the Third World* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

4. Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Croydon: Profile Books, 2005); and Francis Fukuyama, ed., *Nation Building* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006)

5. James Dobbins, ed., *America's Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003)

circumstantial outlooks of North Korean contingency.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, this study lists a variety of factors related to stabilization addressed in previous research, and describes particular features of these factors through causality analysis. This study further examines selected factors to investigate their significance. Also, the study conducts a comparative analysis of different cases to verify the major determinants of stabilization.<sup>8</sup> This analysis is limited to military governments, civil-military affairs, and stabilization strategies implemented in the reconstruction process of four cases: the military governments of Germany, Japan, and Korea after World War II and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq which was established after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Important factors in the stabilization of a country include the maintenance of public security, human security, economic and infrastructural development, rule and maintenance of order, and other societal relationships.<sup>9</sup> The collapse and preservation of the state system are determined by the political, economic and societal factors, international relationships, and political ideologies of a particular nation-state.<sup>10</sup> In the case of North Korea, contingency or “sudden change” is based on the theory of state system collapse whereby a socialist regime transforms into democratic one. In particular, the leadership of the head of state, underlying ideologies, and the central-

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6. SIGIR, *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience* (Washington, D.C.: Us Independent Agencies and Commissions, 2013)

7. Bruce W. Bennett, *Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2013)

8. For greater details about the method, see John P. Frendreis, “Explanation of Variation and Detection of Covariation: The Purpose and Logic of Comparative Analysis,” *Comparative Political Studies* 16, no. 2 (1983), pp. 255-272.; Ingo Rohlfing, *Case Studies and Causal Inference* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 97-124.

9. *Stability Operations: JP 3-07* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), pp. I-2-I-3.

10. Dongkyu Lee, Inseok Seo, Gigeun Yang, “Long-term Foresight Study of North Korea System Collapse from System Collapse Viewpoint — Take Advantage of Dynamic Modelling Analysis Technique —” *Journal of Safety and Crisis Management* 7, no. 1 (2011), pp. 85-88.

ized state organizations are keys to the preservation of the system.<sup>11</sup> If these mechanisms fail, the state's durability will suffer.<sup>12</sup>

The Iraq War is another example following the United States' shift towards reconstruction efforts over battlefield success. The military victory was not sufficient to secure war-torn Iraq as the political power vacuum quickly created chaos and instability across the nation. The aftermath of the Iraq War highlighted the importance of successful military rule and stabilization efforts.<sup>13</sup> This builds a strong case for the necessity of quick restoration of the North Korean government's day-to-day functions after the contingency. Accordingly, there should be reconstruction efforts in North Korea similar to what took place in post-war Germany and Japan. However, this article bases its findings on the assumption that the ROK government extends its governing authority in restored areas after North Korea contingency rather than the establishment of a new government in North Korea.

Various factors have affected military governments' stabilization strategies. Based on previous research on systemic collapse and stabilization, this study assumes that military governments produce better outcomes in stabilization efforts with a centralized power in place. Thus, it is also assumed that governments which historically have decreased in structural authority may encounter severe difficulties in stabilization efforts. Additionally, external intervention in national politics can be considered a control variable, not an outright causal factor, in the outcomes of stabilization.

The following lists the four factors considered in this study, and how they are defined: First, the "political factor" specifically refers to the degree of concentration of political power. In particular, it indicates

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11. Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz, *Alfred Wayne Penn, Politics of Ideocracy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 118-123.

12. The model of analysis is applicable if North Korea fully collapses. But a partial collapse or internal civil war might evolve into situations that we encountered in Libya and Syria.

13. Mark T. Berger, "Nation-Building to State-Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-state System and the Changing Global Order," in *From Nation-Building to State-Building*, Mark T. Berger (ed.) (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 2.

how much power and administration belong to a central government. Whether or not power belongs to this government is a major determining factor of stabilization. Second, the “economic factor” refers to the degree of economic stability that exists during the process of state system transformation. Third, the “race factor” indicates racial differences. The study compares U.S. military occupiers and the occupied population by their racial differences, to see whether they coincide with each other. Finally, this study uses the “social factor,” which specifically aims to verify the existence and degree of social divisions.

The study divides military governments into two categories: one which emerged in the management of defeated countries and liberated colonial states after World War II, and the other which emerged in the 21st century. The cases of Germany, Japan, and Korea belong to the first group, while the case of Iraq, which occurred in 2003, corresponds to the second group. Although there exists a wide time gap between the two groups, the review of previous research on military governments in similar cases, which occurred in extremely fragmented and decentralized societies, revealed that there are some major factors that determine the impact of military governments on stabilization regardless of time periods.<sup>14</sup>

Comparative political research seeks to determine universalities, but universal analyses can be limited by regional particularities. Moreover, the political behaviors of Iraq and North Korea are very different from those of democratic countries, though, granted, the political systems of those two countries also highly differ from each other. Nevertheless, the authors have determined that the conditions relevant to the aims of this study can be comparable.<sup>15</sup> In order to explain the unique characteristics of North Korea’s state system and political changes in Middle East, this study aims to identify diverse factors that laid the backgrounds of political phenomena.<sup>16</sup>

14. James Dobbins, ed., *America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq*, pp. 157-160.

15. *Fragile States Index*, <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/> (accessed August 20, 2015).

16. Namsik In, “The Characteristics and Implications of the Political Upheaval in Arab States in 2011,” *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 51, no. 4 (2011), pp. 247-250.

## Comparison of Stabilization Strategies in Action

### *Germany (1945-1949)*

As Hitler took power under the banner of National Socialism, the features of a nationalism-based unitary state intensified in Germany.<sup>17</sup> By accusing the Jewish people of being the sources of social ills in fact created by the German defeat in World War I, Hitler maximized the level of social division.<sup>18</sup> One of the characteristics of a totalitarian political regime is a monopoly of power; all political power is concentrated in, and is distributed from, the center.<sup>19</sup> Occupation by the Allied Forces was designed to eliminate Nazism and militarism, and to prevent Germany from threatening world peace again. Thus, the American military occupation in Germany was not for the purpose of liberating Germany, but to rule a defeated enemy state. Furthermore, the Allied Forces intended to hold high-ranking Nazis accountable for war crimes committed during World War II.<sup>20</sup> The U.S. forces defined the concept of military government as the highest authority that a military could exercise, and encompassed all activities of governing the population and properties in areas reclaimed from the occupation of enemy forces. They also stipulated that the process of occupation could be accomplished through either agreement or force, and that occupation does not mean that the sovereignty of the occupied government is entirely handed over to the occupying force, but rather that only the right to control is handed over temporarily.<sup>21</sup>

Initially, the U.S. military government in Germany was established

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17. Otto Dann, trans. *Insuk Oh, Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland 1770-1990* (Seoul: Hanul, 1996), pp. 140-258.

18. Robert C. Tucker, *Politics as Leadership* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981), pp. 89-91.

19. Linz, Juan J, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 70.

20. Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 325-327.

21. *Military Government and Civil Affairs: FM 27-5* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army and Navy, 1943), p. 1.

in the context of a very hostile relationship. Because of the differing perspectives held within the Allied Forces and ongoing post-war conflicts, the military government in Germany experienced several difficulties. In particular, the confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union, and the extreme economic hardship in Germany created much friction between the occupying forces and the people of the occupied territories. For instance, in Soviet occupied areas, the functions of the military government were carried out under the guidance of the Soviet Union leadership.<sup>22</sup> Later, however, as the political situation of Germany changed (through the denazification movement) and conditions for democratization improved, the U.S. military government gradually evolved into a system that supported the establishment of democratic government by the Germans. Germans had the capacity and will to operate a centralized state power. The country had traditions of democracy and elections while the political party system, well developed before 1933, could easily re-emerge after 1945. Their capacity and will for autonomy was a critical factor in swiftly ending the U.S. military government.

### ***Japan (1945-1952)***

The reformist forces that led the Meiji Restoration changed the state structure of Japan into a Western system. While demolishing social groups and establishing central government organizations, Japan switched to a modern system in which power concentrated in the state and its emperor.<sup>23</sup> The centrality of the Japanese government was accentuated during World War II as the characteristics of a wartime state system were incorporated.<sup>24</sup> Compared to pre-1933 Germany,

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22. Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Control Mechanism in Germany* (May 26, 1949).

23. Jia Yoo, "National Seclusion and Openness: The Contradiction and Revolution the Japanese Modernization Process Shows," *Journal of Joong-Ang Historical Studies* 27(June 2008), pp. 155-157.

24. Sugin Kweon, "Ethnicity in Contemporary Japan: New Dimensions," *The Korean Journal for Japanese Studies* 19 (2004), pp. 184-187.



the Japanese party system was less developed and the tradition of democracy was more limited.

On August 14, 1945, through "The Imperial Rescript Ending the War," the Japanese emperor warned that it would be against his will for the people to stir up trouble or social division as a backlash of their defeat. He asked the Japanese people not to fall behind in the development of their state by focusing on reconstruction after the defeat.<sup>25</sup> Thanks to the emperor's uniquely revered status in Japanese society, his words were a tremendous boost to the U.S. military officials as they began to organize a military government in Japan.<sup>26</sup> As the place of the Japanese emperor in the postwar political setting was secured, the normalization of the defeated country proceeded relatively smoothly.<sup>27</sup> The authority of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) was unparalleled in the Japanese land. The Japanese government functioned under the governing authority of SCAP, which exercised general administrative power.<sup>28</sup> The military government was able to use both indirect rule, through Japanese government organizations, and direct rule.<sup>29</sup> Hence, although a degree of post-war tumult was inevitable when the U.S. military government began, Japan restored stability relatively quickly after occupation.<sup>30</sup> The occupation was based on the still-functioning administration of Japan except for the temporarily decentralized police. Also, the post-1945 Japanese political parties partly adopted the war-time party systems.

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25. National Archives of Japan, "The Imperial rescript ending the War," <https://www.digital.archives.go.jp> (accessed June 10, 2015).

26. Carl J. Friedrich and Douglas G. Haring, "Military Government for Japan," *Far Eastern Survey* 14, no. 3 (1945), p. 38.

27. Central Intelligence Agency, *Japan Peace Treaty Problems: Issues and Reactions* (November 17, 1947).

28. Ralph J.D Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government in Japan at the Prefectural Level," *The American Political Science Review* 43, no. 2 (1949), pp. 258-259.

29. Eiji Takemame, trans. *Byungkwon Song, GHQ – Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers* (Seoul: Commonlifebooks, 2011), pp. 188-191.

30. Ralph J. D. Braibanti, "Occupation Controls in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey* 17, no. 18 (1948), pp. 215-216.

### **South Korea (1945-1948)**

When an American military government was established in South Korea, there already existed a centralized political system, which had begun before Japanese colonial governance.<sup>31</sup> The military government made sure that no political power among Koreans would replace the military government.<sup>32</sup> At first, the U.S. government prevented Korean political leaders from holding leadership positions and also from intervening in the policy-making of the military government. Furthermore, it did not allow Korean politicians and organizations to play a specific role in, or have extensive input on issues related to, policies that the U.S. military authorities carried out.<sup>33</sup> By the autumn of 1946, Koreans assumed greater responsibility in each administrative department, with U.S. military government providing consultation.<sup>34</sup> In February 1947, Koreans were appointed as heads of civil administration departments, and in May, the military government was renamed as the Korean interim government.<sup>35</sup> The low wages of military government employees fueled widespread corruption, and failure in price controls for consumer goods led to hyper-inflation. These were failures traceable to American military government.<sup>36</sup> According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the new government successfully implemented the initial process of transition to democracy despite various limitations, such as lack of experience with the parliamentary system and power centralization within the President.<sup>37</sup> A number of

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31. Jangjip Choi, *Democracy after Democratization* (Seoul: Humanitasbooks, 2005), p. 60.

32. Meade E. Grant, *American Military Government in Korea* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1951), pp. 29-30.; *Ibid.*, pp. 58-60.

33. U.S. Army and Navy, *Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs: FM 27-5* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 10.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

35. Wanbom Lee, "Relationship between Local Political Groups in Korea and the U.S., after Liberation, 1945-1948," Jihyang Park et al., *New Light on the History of pre- and post-Liberation* (Seoul: Chaeksasang, 2006), p. 79.

36. Channing Liem, "United States Rule in Korea," *Far Eastern Survey* 18, no. 7 (April, 1949), pp. 77-79.

different standards can be used in evaluating the success or failure of the U.S. military government.<sup>38</sup> From the perspective of stabilization, the role of the military government can be evaluated as positive, in that a government that claimed to support democratic values was established, and that it ruled the country peacefully, based on laws and institutions. Gradual transition came successfully in spite of the armed conflicts with the *Namnodang*, the communist party in 1946.

### ***Iraq (2003-2011)***

Historically, Iraq had failed to construct a solid, centralized state power. The Ba'ath Party regime inaugurated in 1968 faced various challenges. Internally, it needed a national integration that embraced the Kurds, and externally, it needed to end interventions by foreign powers (e.g., Iran and the U.S.).<sup>39</sup> During Hussein's reign, the Sunnis gradually prevailed to exclusively wield power, and sectarian conflicts deepened due to the repression of Shias. In turn, the Iraqi government established after the fall of Saddam Hussein was predominantly Shi'ite, while the Sunnis, the power-holders under Saddam, were marginalized.

When the United States waged the Iraq War, it expected to encounter serious challenges in operating a military government even following victory on the battlefield. In October 2002, Peter Pace, the deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted the possibility of ethnic and sectarian violence, the division of Iraqi territory, and the inevitability of post-war U.S. intervention for more than a decade in a "Parade of Horribles," — a list of 29 disasters U.S. would encounter during and after the invasion of Iraq. Ryan Croker, appointed U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, warned in a memo titled "The Perfect Storm" of

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37. Central Intelligence Agency, *Prospects for Survival of the Republic of Korea* (October 28, 1948), pp. 1-8.

38. Robinson Richard D, trans. Miok Jung, *Betrayal of A Nation* (Seoul: Science and Idea, 1988); and Yongok Jung, *Research on U.S. Military Occupational Documents* (Seoul: Seon-In, 2003), pp. 117-179.

39. Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 50.

violent conflicts among different ethnic, sectarian, and racial groups, and the social division of Iraq after the end of the Hussein regime.<sup>40</sup> Specialized military power in sufficient volume was needed to ensure public security within an unstable domestic political situation.<sup>41</sup> Manpower numbering at least several tens of thousands would be needed for border control, and another hundreds of thousands of troops would be needed to control the entire territory of Iraq. During the war, the U.S. dispatched a small number of troops who were unfamiliar with the Middle East. They were neither specialized in urban warfare nor able to effectively prevent foreign elements from flowing in across Iraqi borders.<sup>42</sup>

Although sovereignty was handed over to the Iraqi government in June 2004, it was not capable of establishing a functioning democracy.<sup>43</sup> Instability and turmoil in Iraq continued because of the absence of a democratic tradition, as well as increasing confrontations between different ethnic groups. Sunnis violently fought back because they were politically excluded. Young Shias also led anti-government activism due to an unemployment crisis. Their conflict with the Kurds further remained an issue that was politically unaddressed.<sup>44</sup>

### ***Implications of Comparative Analysis***

This analysis highlights four factors, namely centralized power, economic stability, racial identity between the military government and the subjects, and the level of social division, that are most important in stabilization strategies. Chief among these was the power structure

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40. SIGIR, *Hard Lessons*, pp. 12-13.

41. R. Royce Kneese Jr., *Force Sizing for Stability Operations* (IDA, 2010); Bruce W. Bennett, *Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2013); and Geunuk Lee, "Preparing for Contingency in North Korea: A Critique to Bruce W. Bennett's Estimates for Military Manpower Requirements," *Journal of National Defense Studies* 57, no. 3 (September 2014)

42. Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong and Right in Iraq," *Nation Building*, pp. 174-175.

43. Geunuk Lee, *The Iraq War* (Paju: Hanul, 2011), p. 185.

44. Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong and Right in Iraq," p. 181.

of the target state under the military government. In countries that have reasonably concentrated political power, the central government was powerful enough to control local administration. As long as the administrative systems of these countries were integrated, it was possible to carry out efficient governance and control of the society. In the case of both Germany and Japan, a centralized government was in place for a significant period before the military government, while Korea had an integrated social structure and culture inherited from traditional dynastic rule. Within Iraq, in contrast, the control of centralized power had been weakened after the fall of Hussein and social conflicts among different sectors and classes intensified.

The economies of each country were all very weak when military governments assumed power. Thus, it is very difficult to distinguish differences in the impact of economic factors on stabilization. There were several cases in which stabilization failed despite American intervention in the form of economic aid intervention. Germany and Japan were special cases in which the extent of industrialization before military government were relatively high when compared to other countries, but this industry had been destroyed by the war.<sup>45</sup> At the beginning of the military government in Germany, the capacity for food distribution was very low.<sup>46</sup> Other factors may be more appropriate in determining stabilization.<sup>47</sup>

The nation-building cases led by the United States indicate that economic conditions were not the primary factor to determine the success of stabilization effort.<sup>48</sup> However, it does not mean that economic conditions should be taken lightly as economic poverty incites social unrest, undermining the political authority. American authorities deemed it necessary to react to economic hardships when they gener-

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45. James Dobbins, ed., *America's Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq*, pp. 160-161.

46. Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, *From Shadow to Substance 1945-1963* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 128-135.

47. James Dobbins, ed., *America's Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq*, pp. 157-159.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 160-161.

ated instability, as in the case of South Korea in 1946. As seen in Iraq, even active U.S. involvement could not reverse negative outcomes. There, resources were not efficiently distributed, and corruption responsible for the monopoly of wealth was widespread. In a survey in 2012, the transparency of Iraq was ranked 169th among 176 countries surveyed. Compared with previous survey in 2003, in which Iraq ranked 113th out of 133 countries, the situation had worsened.<sup>49</sup>

This study also reveals that the level of social division was extremely serious in the cases of Korea and Iraq. In Korea, the Joint Soviet-American Commission and ideological confrontations aggravated political confusion immediately after its independence. In Iraq, there had been long-term disruptions among the Sunnis, Shias and Kurds, and conflicts intensified further after Hussein's death. In Germany and Japan however, internal conflicts did not increase during the period of military government even though there were concerns about latent conflicts with the socialists. There were racial differences in all cases except for Germany, but no significant impact was found in this matter.<sup>50</sup>

Table 1 summarizes the comparison of the cases. Comparing the cases through a mixed system analysis that focuses on the variables mentioned above indicates that there is a meaningful correlation between stabilization and the structure and characteristics of power. The intervention by a foreign power can be seen as a control variable. Iraq is quite different from the other three cases in each respect. It lacked a developed party system and democratic traditions. Thus, internal structure and the ripple effect of foreign interference, which were confirmed in the case of Iraq, can be regarded as determinants of the failure in stabilization.

This research adds a number of important insights into the dis-

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49. "Transparency International Annual CPI report," quoted from Michael E. O'Hanlon and Ian Livingston, *"Iraq Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,"* [www.brookings.edu/iraqindex](http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex) (accessed June 15, 2015).

50. This study considers the concept of race like many other social cleavages such as culture, religion.

Table 1. Comparative Analysis of Stabilization Strategies

Division		Germany	Japan	Korea	Iraq	Characteristics	
						+	-
Variable	Central power	+	+	+	-	Concentrated	Fragmented
	Economic stability	-	-	-	-	Stable	Unstable
	Race	+	-	-	-	Same	Different
	Social division	+	+	-	-	Integrated	Disintegrated
Effect	Stabilization	+	+	+	-	Success	Failure

cussion on structural problems and effects of foreign interventions in Iraq. First, this article tries to examine the clash of ethnic cultures and social conflicts as parts of structural problems in Iraq. Before the case of Iraq emerged, Samuel Huntington noted that, based on the theory of clashes of civilization, China and Islamic civilization would rise to collide with the Western civilization. He presented a war of civilizations as a virtual scenario.<sup>51</sup> In this regard, multi-layered identities in the Middle East challenged the transplantation of a Western democratic system. There are diverse variables such as tribalism, state nationalism and Arab nationalism, and Islamism coexisting in the region.<sup>52</sup> Discord among tribes was not overcome, even by a strong religious ideology. Instability is inevitable when a country is fragmented by tribal allegiances.<sup>53</sup> However, it cannot be asserted that differences in civilization are necessarily the cause of this tragic outcome. It can also be explained by the concept of multiple individual civilizations co-

51. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster), 1996.

52. Namsik In, *Study on the Application of Constructivism on the Middle East Identity Layers* (Seoul: IFANS, 2011).

53. Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), pp. 192-196.

existing in various layers.<sup>54</sup>

Second, this research looks at types of foreign interventions and their consequences. The extremists that support anti-government activities in Iraq had flown into the country through its porous borders with Syria and Jordan. The U.S.-led military authority in Iraq initially judged that the opposition powers organized by the local population could be physically controlled. The U.S. handled Iraq in this traditional approach.<sup>55</sup> Despite American intervention, however, the situation in Iraq deteriorated quickly and unexpectedly.<sup>56</sup>

The Iraq's transition to democracy is more than an internal development in Iraq. Considering geographic proximity and cultural similarities between Iraq and its Arab neighbors, it would have had significant impacts on neighboring Arab states if democracy successfully had taken roots in Iraq. Middle Eastern countries were particularly sensitive to Iraq's political transition to democracy as they were either authoritarian kingdoms or dictatorial republics. Therefore, they were happy to allow insurgent fighters and material support for insurgency flow into Iraq.

Table 2 provides a comparison of policies promoted during the period of military government, which in each case indicates that their objectives and contents were similar. However, strategies for stabilization failed only in Iraq. Germany and Japan had successful stabilization efforts with no violent opposition. South Korea had favorable results after violent conflict with the *Namnodang*. This research compares different variables and tests the hypothesis that stabilization depends on the level of concentration of power and that stabilization can be influenced by interference from neighboring countries. Despite similarities among stabilization strategies, the results of stabilization

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54. Jungin Kang, "Theory of Clash of Civilizations," in *Contemporary Theories of International Relations and Korea*, Chulku Woo, Kunyoung Park (ed.) (Seoul: Sapyoung, 2004), pp. 568-569.

55. Paul Staniland, "Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense is a Good Fence," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (2005), pp. 21-40.

56. Thomas Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters," *International Security* 35, no. 3 (Winter 2010/11), pp. 53-94.



Table 2. Case Study on Military Government and Assessment of Stabilization Strategies

Country	Centralization of power & Intervention of neighboring countries	Main policy	Result
Germany	Concentrated central power	System transition (Democratization), Replacement of privileged class (limited)	Establishment of democratic government, Political and social stability
Japan			
Korea	Concentrated central power	System transition (establishment of government), Humanitarian support Replacement of privileged class (limited)	Establishment of democratic government, Construction of public services Political and social stability
Iraq	Fragmentation of power, Neighboring countries' intervention	System transition (democratization), Humanitarian support, Replacement of privileged class (complete)	Establishment of democratic government, Corruption and weak distribution structure, Occupation of land by anti-government powers

were different depending on contexts for the policy; in other words, the properties of political power.

## Korean Unification and Stabilization Strategies

### *Types of Unification and Contingency*

Among different types of unification, this paper is only concerned with the scenario of sudden change that could occur due to the col-

lapse of North Korea's political system. It cannot be ascertained that the current, unstable elements of the North Korean system will catalyze a contingency, such as the fall of Kim Jung-Un, mass escape from North Korea, or a coup d'état any time in the near future. Furthermore, a realistic analysis should be limited in estimating the potential of a collapse.<sup>57</sup> The international trend of conflicts in the 21st century suggests that military clashes are very frequent, while large-scale wars between countries are relatively rare. Similarly, the majority of the wars that occurred during the Cold War were civil wars that took place during the process of decolonization.<sup>58</sup>

The origin of the concepts of political contingency is not clearly defined; nor is there a related definition agreed upon among scholars.<sup>59</sup> By taking into account the situation in North Korea and relationship between North and South Korea, it is defined here as "a series of processes related to unexpected circumstances, except for war, in North Korea, such as accidents involving the person in highest power, coup d'état, power struggle, or people's uprising, including extreme situations where the current political power and system break down."<sup>60</sup> However, if South Korean military intervention occurs before a full regime collapse, it may escalate the conflict as in the case of Syria, Libya and partly Iraq. Both a delayed and a premature intervention might be problematic. Thus, should sudden change occur, there must be a timely execution of the correct stabilization strategy, to prepare for a massive outflow of refugees from North Korea, violent insurgency, and large-scale social upheaval.

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57. Youngho Park, "Theoretical Study on North Korean Collapse," *Tasks and Measures for Korean Contingencies* (National Security and Defense Academic Conferences Sourcebook, Korean Political Association, November 14, 1997).

58. Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Core, *Global Report 2014 Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility* (Vienna:Center for Systemic Peace, 2014), pp. 11-14.

59. Sangdon Jung, Jinmoo Kim, and Kangkyu Lee, *Reunification Policy of West Germany and the Sudden Change of East Germany* (Seoul: KIDA Press, 2012), p. 20.

60. Sungwook Nam, "Crisis of Korean Peninsula and Efficient Contingency Plan: Economic Aspects," in *Contingency Plan for North Korea's Crisis*, National Development Institute, Center for North Korean Studies of Korea University (ed.) (Seoul: Hanul, 2007), p. 93.

### ***Circumstances for Stabilization***

During the period of military rule under the Soviet Union in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula above the 38th parallel, the consolidation of political power intensified in North Korea. In particular, deification of Kim Il-Sung strengthened the monopoly on power, and a sole dominant system was established in 1956.<sup>61</sup> The control structure of Kim Jong-Un's reign further solidifies the totalitarian regime based on one-man leadership. When sudden changes occur, it is highly likely that the ideology and values of the North Korean people will cause conflicts, as their background deeply rooted in the formation of socialism and the special social structure of North Korea will collide with trends of reform and social change. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain the existing power structure in North Korea. Furthermore, if a military government is established in the northern half of the peninsula, some elements of the central administrative structure of North Korea can be useful for governance in the initial stabilization effort. If the centralized political system plays a positive role in the ruling military government in this process, the goal of stabilization will be achieved early.

The chronic economic crisis of North Korea can hardly improve without a fundamental reform of the state system, because it is inherent to the economic structure. If economic crisis is exacerbated during a period of sudden changes, social divisions within North Korea and between North and South Korea can deepen and widen. This study hypothesizes that the South Korean forces would lead the military government in the northern area, while American forces intervene only in air and maritime support operations and other limited areas. U.S. military involvement is likely to generate North Korean or Chinese opposition because of the memory of Korean War and geopolitical rivalry between the U.S. and China. Given the racial factor, if South Korean forces run the military government in North Korea after the

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61. Wankyū Choi, ed., *Study on the Changing State Character of North Korea: Solidification of Exceptional State* (Seoul: Hanul, 2001).

collapse, race-related conflict would not occur as long as the U.S. forces do not directly participate. To achieve complete unification, however, the severe disparity between the South and the North that has developed over the past 70 years, despite the fact that North and South Koreans share the same ethnicity, should be addressed, and national homogeneity should be recovered through various policies that Germany adopted after their reunification in 1990. If the unification is limited simply to the territory itself, the division between the two countries could increase, because of class conflicts between North and South Koreans. Therefore, the military government should enact integration plans in a manner to boost cultural homogeneity.

When political contingency occurs in North Korea, social disruption will be grave, regardless of the existence of central power. However, as confirmed through the case study, deepening social division does not necessarily lead to failure in stabilization. Two aspects should be taken into account if social division becomes severe. First, severe social divisions can either weaken the control of the central government or prompt specific interest groups to provoke social fragmentation, thus causing instability throughout the society. Second, foreign forces sometimes intervene to disrupt the convergence of power or to support insurgents, thus aggravating social confusion. Like the case of Iraq, intervention by foreign forces may intensify instability. This is valid for both Chinese and ROK intervention if it happens before a full regime collapse. Thus, it is also necessary to review the possibility of foreign forces intervening in the Korean Peninsula during a period of sudden change.

Sudden changes in North Korea will have significant ripple effects on the international political situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Hence, a stabilization policy should accommodate the interests of its surrounding countries. Especially in Northeast Asia, a balance of power is critical with the strengthened confrontation of four major powers and their respective alliances, the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia. Uncertainty and complexity of international situations are increasing, as shown in worldwide financial crisis, China emerging as a "G2 (Group of Two)" power, international demand for

democracy, the instability of North Korean politics, and acceleration of efforts to develop WMD's in North Korea.<sup>62</sup> These anxiety drivers are likely to continue, because of the structural characteristics of international politics in Northeast Asia. This suggests that the intervention of international power can be a critical variable to determine the stabilization of North Korea.

The power that intervenes in North Korea's contingency, other than South Korea, can be referred to as the "third party," "neighboring country" or "foreign power." Multiple definitions of such powers are possible, depending on alliance or other special relationships. In this paper, however, it is defined as all countries other than South Korea.

First, this discussion addresses China, which is the closest among the countries that may intervene in issues in the Korean Peninsula. For China, North Korea has continuously played a pivotal role as a security buffer zone. China, which considers the stability of the peninsula to be paramount, is concerned about the potential fall of North Korea and will intend to prevent instability in its northeastern border regions and the influx of North Korean refugees into China in advance, by active involvement in North Korea.<sup>63</sup> Thus, North Korea's collapse may have a large impact on the Chinese calculation of national interests. As China and North Korea share a border of more than 1,000 kilometers, China, as the most directly affected country, is expected to promptly engage in their own stabilization strategies.<sup>64</sup>

Second, if China intervenes, Russia, which traditionally has a relationship with North Korea, may bring its military forces into Hamgyung Province. Moreover, Japan may bring its Self-Defense Forces onto the Korean Peninsula to support the U.S. operation, based

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62. Ministry of Unification, *2013 White Paper* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification), pp. 17-18.

63. Adam P. Liff, "U.S. Policy toward North Korea: The China Fallacy," *Pacific Forum CSIS* (October 8, 2009), p. 1, <http://www.pacforum.org> (accessed June 12, 2015).

64. Bruce W. Bennett, *Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse*, pp. 87-101.

on the country’s right to collective self-defense.<sup>65</sup>

Third, as a part of ROK-U.S. alliance, the United States will execute various operational plans in close coordination with its ROK partner. Accordingly, it is likely that there will be combined military efforts in North Korea as the ROK and United States jointly advance into the North.

This article does not include other types of contingencies in North Korea nor the potential case of joint intervention by ROK and U.S. in the event of North Korean contingency. These issues demand more discussion through future studies to clarify the thinking surrounding them.

Table 3 provides a comparison of stabilization factors. Two different outlooks can be predicted for the future of North Korea if sudden changes occur. In Scenario A, the unified political system of the coun-

**Table 3. Comparative Analysis of Central Power Concentration among the Stabilization Factors in North Korea and Iraq**

Classification		Iraq (Fragmentation)	North Korea (Future contingency)		Characteristics	
			Unification scenario (A)	Fragmentation scenario (B)	+	-
Variable	Central power	-	+	-	Concentrated	Fragmented
	Economic stability	-	-	-	Stable	Unstable
	Race	-	+	+	Same	Different
	Social division	-	-	-	Integrated	Disintegrated
Effect	Stabilization	-	+	-	Success	Failure

65. Cheolho Jeong, *ROK’s Security Strategy for Chinese Military Intervention in North Korean Contingency* (Seongnam: Sejong Institute, 2014).

try is maintained, as the central concentration of power continues even after drastic change. In this case, control by central power is still valid, and thus, its integrated structure and administrative function are also valid or recoverable, even when factors that threaten the security of the system emerge. In Scenario B, the control of the central power dissolves, leading to the fragmentation of the existing structure. In this case, a number of competitive powers emerge, and the system of public administration and social safety net is destroyed. Stabilization succeeds in scenario A, but not in B. The scenario to be realized will depend on the early success or failure of stabilization strategies.

### ***Contingency in North Korea and Stabilization Strategies***

The comparison of stabilization's success and failure cases shows two differences. First, in Germany, Japan, and Korea (where the Japanese military was originally present), defeated countries were completely disarmed after the war under U.S. leadership. In Iraq however, the U.S. military and new Iraqi government were unable to suppress the Sunni-led insurgency, and arms and supporting powers entered the country through its borders. Second, the population in Germany, Japan and Korea actively collaborated with the systemic transitions that unfolded after the occupation by the U.S. forces because the majority of them had suffered under totalitarian regimes and colonial occupation. In Iraq by contrast, the power relationship between the dominant group and subordinate group changed in the political system transition process, leading to serious resistance from the former power.

Controlling the North Korean forces effectively will be a challenging task. For efficient management, the majority of active soldiers can be labelled as "grey" (potential threats) and high-ranking officers as "black" (threatening elements).<sup>66</sup> An analysis of the military integra-

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66. *Civil-Military Operations: TC 07-3-10* (Daejeon: Training & Doctrine Command of Army, 2007), pp. 5-48.

tion between East and West Germany should inform the design of a strategic approach tailored specifically for North Korea (indeed, North and South Yemen, which had armed conflict starting in 1994, may offer a better analogy.<sup>67</sup> Additionally, humanitarian issues that rise during initial confusion should be promptly addressed by enhancing relief activities.

When South Korean military forces intervene in the event of sudden changes in North Korea, legal and normative boundaries must be considered, such as the Korean Constitution, treaties, international laws and codes, and the statements, announcements, and agreements signed between North and South Korea.<sup>68</sup> These laws and norms sometimes conflict with each other, and there are gaps between justification and benefits, and between theory and practice. Moreover, national interests and the interests of international society or neighboring countries do not always coincide. Thus, in preparing for North Korea's sudden changes, such legal problems and issues of international relationships should be reviewed and defined in terms of national laws of South Korea. At the same time, this approach should be accompanied by active diplomatic endeavors. For instance, discussing those problems and issues with international society and neighboring countries in depth is necessary.<sup>69</sup>

Stabilization strategies can be established with two goals in mind. First, intervention by neighboring countries should be deterred, and collaboration between the military government and the occupied country's political and administrative system should be maximized. Second, public security in North Korea should be assured early in the stabilization strategies, and humanitarian support should be enhanced.

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67. Yunghwan Park, *Study on the Possibility of Applying German Model for Inter-Korean Military Integration* (Seoul: Korea Research Institute for Strategy, 2004), p. 62.

68. Myunggi Kim, "Legal Issues of ROK Intervention in North Korean Contingency," *Korean Contingency and International Law* (Korea Institute of National Unification, Korean International Law Symposium November 8, 1997); and Bumchul Shin, "Legal Issues of the Sudden Collapse of North Korea," *Seoul International Law Journal* 15, no. 1 (2008).

69. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), pp. 91-108.



Initially, territorial unification should certainly be established; later, conditions for integration should be established.<sup>70</sup> To achieve these two goals, stabilization strategies in North Korea should be made concrete. Although counterstrategies by different types of sudden changes should be secured, this paper presents strategies at the level of conceptual planning. Table 4 summarizes the case study of Military Government and Stabilization Strategies.

**Table 4. Case Study of Military Government and Tailored Stabilization Strategies in North Korea**

Target	Factors for success/ failure	Environment of Transition (Contingency)	Tailored stabilization strategies
Germany	Democratization of totalitarianism system	Lack of experience with democracy and market economy	Democratization and marketization
Japan	Collaboration of dominating groups	Agitation and desertion of dominating groups	Harmony between old and new powers
Iraq	Intervention of neighboring countries; Resistance to international intervention; Shortage of knowledge in peacekeeping	Potential of the intervention of neighboring countries, including China; Internalized anti- American sentiment; Simultaneous need for forceful maintenance of peace	Establishment of international collaboration; Minimization of American Forces' intervention; Specialization of stabilization operation
Korea	Humanitarian support; Construction of public services	Shortage of food and resources; Disintegration of public services	Emergency relief; Restoration of public services

70. *Joint Stability Operations: JM 3-12* (Seoul: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), pp. 96-98.

Table 5 summarizes past tailored stabilization strategies. It identifies the determinants of success in stabilization through a comparative study and draws lessons accordingly. It further presents a tailored stabilization strategy for North Korean contingency, taking into account the different circumstantial contexts of North Korea from other case studies.

First, in this light, border control and early assurance of public security are the most important and urgent tasks in the event of sudden changes in North Korea. As confirmed in the case of Iraq, border control is vital in order to prevent the fragmentation of power and deter intervention by foreign elements. The Iraqi government, which continued to be unstable even after democratization, recovered its capacity to lead only recently.<sup>71</sup> As it directs military operations inde-

Table 5. Latent Environment of North Korea and Tailored Stabilization Strategies

Target	Main policy for stabilization	Environment of North Korea (Contingency)	Tailored stabilization strategies
National	Enhancing power of central authority	Lack of experience with democracy and market economy; Agitation and desertion of the privileged	Democratization and marketization; Harmony between old and new powers
Common	Restraining neighboring countries' intervention	Disintegration of public services; Shortage of food and resources; Simultaneous need for forcing and maintaining peace; Internalized anti-American sentiment	Restoration of public services; Emergency relief; Specialization of stability operations units; Minimization of the U.S. force's intervention
International		Potential for the intervention by other countries, including China	Formation of international collaboration

pendently, it begins to emerge from its past subordination to U.S. military forces.<sup>72</sup> Arriving at this took a significantly long time because of initial failures in stabilization. Additionally, preventing internal unrest efficiently is also needed to allow for the early provision of humanitarian support.<sup>73</sup>

Second, both national and international elements need to be accounted for in setting up stabilization strategies, because of overlap between certain national elements with international ones. For example, neighboring countries may intervene in the name of humanitarian support, and foment internal instability. Consequently, intervention by neighboring countries may interfere with stabilization by reducing the control of the central power of the country. Thus, complex stabilization strategies that consider both national and international characteristics are required.

Third, depending on the strategies of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces in preparation for sudden changes in North Korea, U.S. Force may be able to enter into North Korea.<sup>74</sup> However, in the process of performing stabilization operations in North Korea, the role of the U.S. forces and the areas of the operation should be minimized. Reducing intervention by American forces is needed to deter the expansion of third party intervention and internal social divisions in North Korea. The intervention of U.S. forces should be designed to be minimal, especially when anti-American sentiment, the history of the rejection of foreign intervention, and national sentiment in North Korea are taken into account.<sup>75</sup>

Fourth is the existence of an organization with specialized capac-

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71. Dafna H. Rand and Nicholas A. Heras, "Iraq's Sunni Reawakening," *Foreign Affairs* 16 (March 2015).

72. Jeremy Binnie, "U.S. Sidelined from Tikrit Offensive," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, March 5, 2015.

73. Shinwha Lee, "State Failure and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Practical Implication for North Korea," *Korean Political Science Review* 46, no. 1 (2012).

74. Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit, *Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea* (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2009), pp. 7-8.

75. Jungil Kim, *Kim Jung Il Works* 9 (Pyongyang: Workers Party of Korea Press, 1997), p. 32.

ity to perform civil military operations (CMO).<sup>76</sup> Peace keeping capabilities to maintain and manage peace effectively are a necessary condition for the next stage — state reconstruction.<sup>77</sup> Civil control can be made possible in a stabilized context. Until a full-scale government is set up, the role of military organizations in maintaining public security is critical. However, military peacekeeping operations are far from simple. Maintaining and enforcing peace require a different approach to military operations and engagement rules. Thus, both cannot be accomplished perfectly. Comparing the characteristics of the Canadian and U.S. Armies, Francis Fukuyama pointed out that using a military that is performing combat duty for the purpose of peacekeeping is inappropriate.<sup>78</sup> It is therefore important to organize armies in multi-layered and multi-role structures to meet strategic need through appropriate operations or tactics. This structure becomes more complex if international organs, such as the UN, intervene.<sup>79</sup>

Fifth, if the existing dominating elite class is efficiently replaced with new power in North Korea, and such new power is well supported, North Korea's early stabilization can be achieved. The replacement of dominant elite targets both the ruling class and the public. Fear of the collapse of the system should be minimized through proper coordination between old and new powers.<sup>80</sup> If the North Korean forces are dismantled early or abolished in controlled areas, they are likely to grow to become a threatening power within the North or towards South Korea.

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76. *Joint Civil-Military Operations: JM 3-6* (Seoul: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), pp. 6-7.

77. *Peace Operations: JP 3-07.3* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012), p. I-8.

78. Francis Fukuyama, "Guidelines for Future Nation-Building," *Nation Building*, pp. 232-234.

79. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (New York: United Nations, 2008), pp. 66-74.

80. For further information on the properties of the North Korean elite, refer to Jaechon Lim, *Kim Jong Il's leadership of North Korea* (London: Routledge, 2009); and Jina Kim, "An Analysis of Political Instability in the DPRK: Identity, Interest, and Leader-Elite Relations," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 25, no. 1 (March 2013), pp. 87-107.

## Conclusion

Countries in which the controlling power of the central government was, or is being, lost are classified as fragmented countries. If government-guaranteed social welfare becomes wholly insufficient or chronic civil war continues in these countries, they are likely to become failed states even if state power still exerts control within their borders, and the concentration of central power will gradually diminish.<sup>81</sup> The concept of fragmentation is useful in explaining situations in which the central governing authority's power weakens. However, different variables, such as the concentration of power, capacity for government control, and decentralization, need detailed consideration. This study focuses on four variables to diagnose the possibility of success and failure of stabilization strategies undertaken through military governance. In addition to these variables, minute additional elements can influence outcomes in complex ways.

First, because of the anti-American sentiments that emerged during the Korean War, it is very likely that North Korean forces and other fragmented power groups will continuously threaten the authority of the military government, perhaps working in collaboration with China and other countries. During the Korean War, the United States all but razed North Korea to the ground through carpet-bombing operations by its overwhelmingly superior air force. It sowed terror through the inhumane threat of fiery death through the use of napalm bombs, killing many non-combatants in this manner.<sup>82</sup> North Korea described it as "brutal bombing."<sup>83</sup> North Korea's anti-American sentiment was created through the experience of the Korean War, and it deepened due to the post-war siege-mentality. A situation where the

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81. Erin K. Jenne, "Sri Lanka: A Fragmented State," in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, Robert I. Rotberg (ed.) (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and the World Peace Foundation, 2003), pp. 219-223.

82. Bruce Cumings, *North Korea: Another Country* (New York: The New Press, 2004), pp. 15-31.

83. Ilsung Kim, *Kim Il Sung Works 8* (Pyongyang: Workers Party of Korea Press, 1980), p. 12.

U.S. is actively involved in military governance in North Korea is very likely to prompt significant resistance.

The hostility towards foreign intervention is not confined to the United States alone. China and Russia, which supported North Korea during the early days of North Korea and the Korean War, are not immune from the backlash against foreign intervention. The U.S., China, and Russia inflicted heavy losses on North Korean residents as they sent troops to North Korea during the course of the Korean War. Any intervention from China will be met with a great level of skepticism and scorn due to China's numerous invasions of the Korean peninsula historically. Japanese involvement in military operations around the Korean peninsula might also generate strong resentment and anger in both Koreas as the Japanese occupation of Korea is still bitterly remembered. It should be noted that the Iraqi memory of Western colonialism was also a key factor in generating widespread insurgency in wake of U.S. invasion.

Therefore, South Korean forces should lead the military government at the front, whereas the U.S. should participate in the system by providing collaborative support in the backend during the initial stages.

Second, to operate successful military governance in a society where a sole totalitarian system has been active as the fundamental power for more than 70 years, democracy and the merits of a market economy should be effectively established. In particular, addressing economic poverty through providing basic necessities in the beginning of military governance is essential to win North Korean support for the process of stabilization. Furthermore, it is possible that China, which is very likely to intervene in the Korean peninsula because of their geographical proximity and previous military alliance, could incapacitate any effort towards military governance. From this, we can draw the conclusion that international diplomacy should precede the implementation of military governance in order to manage the China factor efficiently.<sup>84</sup> Thus in North Korea, the four variables will

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84. For further information on the strategy cooperation for contingency, refer to

unfold very differently when compared to the military governments in Germany, Japan and Iraq in the past.

Therefore, if drastic changes occur in North Korea, the results of the comparative analysis in this paper may be used to predict the determinants of stabilization. The analysis herein confirms that stabilization can succeed when the control of central power is assured and the intervention of 'unwanted' foreign elements is deterred through effective military governance. The case of North Korea includes both relative advantages and disadvantages compared to the case of Iraq. Potential interventions by neighboring countries (e.g. China) and stubborn North Korean forces are negative factors for stabilization. On the other hand, centralized power and cultural conditions are advantageous factors. The potential for the success of stabilization in North Korean contingency increases when disadvantageous factors are minimized, while advantageous factors are maximized. To maximize the potential for success, it is necessary to plan for these various possible contingent scenarios and design respective countermeasures.

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